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"privacy," like "free" before it, has taken on a normative meaning in the
marketplace. When consumers see the term "privacy policy," they believe that their
personal information will be protected in specific ways; in particular, they assume
that a website that advertises a privacy policy will not share their personal
information. Of course, this is not the case. Privacy policies today come in all
different flavors. Some companies make affirmative commitments not to share the
personal information of their consumers. In other cases, however, privacy policies
simply inform consumers that unless they "opt out" of sharing certain information,
the company will communicate their personal information to other commercial
entities.
Given that consumers today associate the term "privacy policy" with specific
practices that afford a normative level of privacy protection, the use of the term by a
website that does not adhere to these baseline practices can mislead consumers to
expect privacy that, in reality, does not exist. This is not to suggest that companies
intend to mislead consumers, but rather that consumers today associate certain
practices with "privacy policy" just as they associate certain terms and conditions
with the word "free."
Because the term "privacy policy" has taken on a specific meaning in the
marketplace and connotes a particular level of protection to consumers, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") should regulate the use of the term "privacy policy" to
ensure that companies using the term deliver a set of protections that meet
consumers' expectations and that the term "privacy policy" does not mislead
consumers during marketplace transactions.
1 Often consumers are not provided with a means to "opt out" of information sharing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years have passed since the FTC's last comprehensive
hearings on the future of consumer protection. In that time, the FTC
has pursued a self-regulatory approach to protecting the privacy of
personal information, working with industry to deliver market-based
approaches ranging from industry best practices, self-regulatory
initiatives, advances in technology, and consumer education.
A core goal of these efforts has been to publicize how personal
information is handled by companies, in the belief that, if armed with
accurate information, consumers will make privacy choices consistent
with their personal needs. The FTC has established a set of
disclosures that responsible companies should provide to consumers in
order to facilitate the consumers' exercise of informed choice about
privacy in the marketplace.
Ten years later, it is appropriate to ask what effects these
disclosures have had on consumers' experiences in the marketplace.
Have improved privacy disclosures allowed consumers to achieve the
level of privacy they desire in marketplace transactions? Are
consumers more at ease with respect to privacy in marketplace
transactions today then they were ten years ago? What is the effect of
the existence of "privacy policies" at most of the leading websites?
What do consumers think when they see the term "privacy policy"?
This article attempts to answer these questions based on existing
peer-reviewed research and consumer surveys conducted in the
academic sector. The article examines the strengths and limitations of
the notice-based approach to facilitating privacy in the consumer
marketplace. Using (1) survey data on consumers' privacy
expectations, (2) existing research on whether and in what instances
consumers read and comprehend notices, (3) the role information
asymmetry and psychological barriers to information processing and
risk assessment play in privacy decision-making, and (4) insights
about interface design and information presentation, this article
identifies several factors that limit the ability of the notice-based
approach, operating alone, to meet the varying privacy needs of
consumers in the marketplace. It concludes that:
* Without a baseline set of information practices, the term
"privacy policy" is confusing to the consumer;
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* The lack of common disclosure language undermines
consumers' ability to "shop for privacy," thereby
undermining businesses' ability to compete on privacy;
" Shortened notices are a promising step toward encouraging a
successful privacy marketplace for the consumers who read
notices;
" Privacy must be "usable" if it is to serve consumer needs;
therefore, incorporating expertise from fields such as human
computer interaction and psychology is imperative; and
* If consumers are not able to make informed choices about
information privacy and computer security, then it is
inevitable that bad actors will undermine consumer privacy
and the security of the network infrastructure.
At this ten-year interval, it is important to consider the effect of the
FTC's approach to privacy. Research provides important information
about the strengths and limitations of the FTC's work to date. The
FTC should use this information to refine and adjust its policy to
reflect what we know today about consumer expectations and actions
in the marketplace. In addition, this article's conclusions, listed above,
suggest several additional interventions in the marketplace:
* Require businesses that advertise a "privacy policy" to
provide some baseline privacy protections that meet
established consumer expectations;
* Standardize disclosures and terminology to facilitate
comparison shopping by consumers and competition among
firms based on privacy practices;
* Shorten notices to reduce the transaction costs associated
with reading long, indecipherable End User License
Agreements ("EULAs"); and,
* Include information from other disciplines, including
usability and human computer interaction, in future privacy
and security initiatives.
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II. THE FTC'S APPROACH TO CONSUMER PRIVACY
Just over ten years ago, the FTC conducted its last forward-looking
proceeding in which it analyzed the future of consumer protection in a
high-tech economy. In a report from that proceeding, the FTC
concluded that the essential elements of a balanced consumer
protection program are:
* Coordinated law enforcement by state and federal agencies
against fraud and deception;
" Industry self-regulation and private initiatives to protect
consumers; and
* Consumer education through the combined efforts of
government, business, and consumer groups.
2
The report continues:
The hearing record is replete with examples of private
initiatives: industry self-regulation programs and plans to
develop and expand such programs, technology-based
consumer protections and self-help opportunities, and
commitments to undertake new consumer education
programs. These and other initiatives will be crucial in
providing consumer protection in the new marketplace.
3
Over the past ten years, the FTC has pursued these three goals. It
has brought an impressive array of actions under the agency's
authority to prosecute unfair or deceptive trade practices. It has
fostered self-regulatory programs and it continues to operate
multilingual consumer outreach both online and offline.
The FTC established five Fair Information Practice Principles
("FIPPS")--notice, choice, access, security and accountability-as the
2 Federal Trade Commission, Anticipating the 21st Century: Consumer Protection Policy in
the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace (hearing report, May 1996): 46 (formatting added).
Also available online at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gcv2.pdf.
' Ibid.
4 Marcia Hoffman, "Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy," in Proskauer on
Privacy (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 2006).
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
framework for self-regulatory and regulatory initiatives. The
Commission's approach omitted several important data protection
principles that were recognized by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Guidelines ("OECD"), including the
concepts of "data minimization," which requires companies to restrict
the amount of personal information collected to only that which is
necessary for a transaction, and "purpose specification," which
requires companies to have a clear and legitimate purpose for data
collection.
The absence of these two principles has led firms to collect
extraneous information and to repurpose information without
consumer consent. After adopting its limited set of FIPPS, the FTC
highlighted the importance of notice and security. The agency did
intervene to set standards for children's privacy that are stronger than
the norm; the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")
requires prior parental consent before personal information can be
collected from children under the age of thirteen.5 In general, though,
the agency put substantial resources behind encouraging adaptation of
notice, and the development of "short notices." The market-based
approach to privacy in the electronic commerce sphere adopted by the
FTC was a departure from a tradition of privacy laws, such as the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA") and the Privacy Act of 1974,
which embraced a full set of FIPPS to protect personal information.
Most e-commerce sites today have privacy policies, but whether
these policies provide privacy protection remains an open question.
The FTC has not evaluated the basic assumption of the market-based
model to privacy protection: that with good information consumers
will make good choices. Echoing the recommendations from the 1995
hearings, Chairman Majoras seeks to employ the same techniques used
to protect privacy during the last decade:
First, we must study and evaluate new technologies so that
we are as prepared as possible to deal with harmful,
collateral developments. Second, we need to bring
appropriate law enforcement actions to reaffirm that
fundamental principles of FTC law apply in the context of
new technologies. Third, we must look to industry to
implement self-regulatory regimes and, more importantly, to
5 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Public Law 105-277, codified at U.S.
Code 15 (2000), §§ 6501 et seq.
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develop new technologies. Finally, we need to educate
consumers so that they can take steps to protect themselves.6
At this important juncture, it makes sense to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of these techniques. Before the FTC decides what
approaches to pursue during the next decade, we suggest that the
agency critically reflect on research that explores the effectiveness of
the self-regulatory system.
The FTC has held close the assumption that introducing additional
information about companies' data practices into the marketplace
through self-regulatory systems, combined with consumer self-help,
will allow consumers to adequately protect their privacy as they see fit.
But research shows that consumers continue to have high levels of
concern for privacy of personal information. It also reveals that the
EULAs and privacy policies used to convey this information to
consumers are not effective-they are rarely read and are in many
instances unreadable. More importantly, consumers appear to believe
that the term "privacy policy" conveys a specific level of privacy
protection. Confusion exists among consumers concerning what rights
they have and can exercise over personal information. Interestingly,
while the FTC has pursued self-regulatory solutions to consumer
privacy, the large majority of consumers believe incorrectly that laws
protect their personal information from secondary use.
III. RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THE LIMITS
OF THE DISCLOSURE-BASED APPROACH
A. CONSUMERS CARE DEEPLY ABOUT PRIVACY
Surveys conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center show
that Americans care deeply about the privacy of their personal
information and that despite the FTC's ten-year commitment to self-
regulation 7 they are nevertheless concerned about information
collection. A 2003 Annenberg survey found that 70% of advanced
6 Deborah Platt Majoras, "Finding the Solutions to Fight Spyware: The FTC's Three
Enforcement Principles," (remarks, Anti-Spyware Coalition, Washington, D.C., February 9,
2006): 3, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060209cdtspyware.pdf.
7 Unless otherwise noted, the public polling data presented are from two national surveys
created by Professor Turow and carried out by the firm ICR/International Communication
Research of Media, Pennsylvania. For the 2003 survey, infra note 8, ICR interviewed by
phone a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adults who were using the Internet at home.
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users agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, "I am nervous
about websites having information about me.' '8 In 2005, the same
response was reported by 79% of respondents. 9 Individuals also
believe that they are put at risk as a result of information collection.
Only 17% agreed with the proposition, "What companies know about
me won't hurt me."
10
A high level of concern is also reported about both commercial and
government collection of personal information. In 2003, 92% reported
that they would be concerned if marketers were "collecting
information about your household members' activities without your
knowledge or consent."' 1 Similarly 83% would be concerned if the
government was "collecting information about your household
members' activities without your knowledge or consent." 12  (52%
believed the federal government was doing that. 13) Respondents also
believe that they should be in control of marketing communications.
For instance, 94% reported that websites should ask for permission
before sending ads.1
B. CONSUMERS FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTAND
THE "PRIVACY POLICY" LABEL
Supporters of privacy self-regulation suggest that Americans' high
levels of concern will be alleviated when they begin to examine their
options for releasing personal data. Professor Alan Westin, for
For the 2005 survey, infra note 9, ICR interviewed by phone a nationally representative
sample of 1,200 adults who said they used the Internet in the past month.
8 Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System is Broken (Philadelphia:
Annenberg Public Policy Center, June 2003): 16. Also available online at
http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/internet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf
9 Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman and Kimberly Meltzer, Open to Exploitation: American
Shoppers Online and Offline (Philadelphia: Annenberg Public Policy Center, June 2005): 4.
Also available online at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/
InformationAndSociety/Turow_APPCReportWEBFINAL.pdf.
'
0 Ibid.
Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 19-20.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 19.
14 Ibid., 28.
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example, has written that most Americans take an informed cost-
benefit tack in relation to their information online and offline.15 "They
examined the benefits to them or society of the data collection and use,
wanted to know the privacy risks and how organizations proposed to
control those, and then decided whether to trust the organization or
seek legal oversight.' 6 This characterization of most Americans as
being aware of their online privacy options supports the viewpoint of
Internet industry players that posting an accurate privacy policy on
every site would create a world of optimal consumer privacy in which
each individual shopped with his or her mouse for privacy that
matched his or her personal needs.
Unfortunately that does not appear to be happening. One could
assume from this that consumers do not care, the argument being that
companies give individuals information and they ignore it or fail to
value the privacy choices it offers. However, research tells a far more
complex story about why privacy disclosures alone have failed to
alleviate the privacy concerns of individuals.
The push for privacy disclosures has resulted in a world of
legalistically phrased privacy policies that begin by assuring the
consumer that the site cares about his or her privacy, but then proceeds
to confuse the consumer with technical language about "affiliate" and
"non-affiliate" sharing, required disclosures, distinctions between
personally identifiable information ("PII") and aggregate data,
inapplicability with regard to other sites, or content that may be
included or accessed from the site, and finish with the caveat that the
privacy policy can change at any time, with or without notice. 17
Both the 2003 and 2005 Annenberg surveys revealed, however,
that American adults do not know that privacy policies merely tell
people how the site will use their information: whether or not, and
how, they will share it with affiliates and outside firms. 18  Most
15 A. F. Westin, "Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy," Journal of Social Issues 59,
no.2 (2003): 445.
6 Ibid.
17 For example, of 64 website privacy policies that were reviewed between 2001 and 2003,
Jensen and Potts found that eight (13%) offered no mention of how changes to the policy
would be conveyed to the user, twelve policies (19%) offered to notify users through email
and a posting on the policy page, and 44 policies (69%) required users to check the policy
page periodically. C. Jensen and C. Potts, "Privacy Policies as Decision-making Tools: An
Evaluation on Online Privacy Notices," in CHI 2004 Connect: Conference Proceedings (New
York: ACM Press, 2004), 471-78.
8 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation, 3.
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Americans believe, logically, that the phrase "privacy policy" signifies
that their information will be kept private. In the 2003 survey, 57% of
the nationally representative sample of 1,200 adults who were using
the Internet at home agreed or agreed strongly with the statement,
"When a web site has a privacy policy, I know that the site will not
share my information with other websites or companies." 19 In the
2005 survey, questioners asked 1,200 nationally representative adults
who said they had used the Internet in the past month whether that
statement is true or false; 59% answered it is true.
20
C. CONSUMERS MISUNDERSTAND ONLINE DATA COLLECTION
The misunderstandings do not stop with the label. The 2003
survey found that 59% of adults who use the Internet at home know
that websites collect information about them even if they do not
register;2 ' however, they do not understand that data-flows behind
22their screens connect seemingly unrelated bits about them. The
survey's interviewers asked respondents to name a site they valued and
then went on to ask their reaction to click-stream advertising,23 which
is actually a common way that sites track, extract and share
information to make money from advertising. Of the surveyed adults
who go online at home, 85% stated that they did not agree to the
collection and aggregation of their data across multiple sites for
purposes of click-stream advertising, even by a "valued" site. 24 When
offered a choice of using a valued site for free and letting information
be collected, or paying for the site and not letting information be
collected, 54% of adults who go online at home said that they would
rather find the information offline than exercise either option
presented.25
19 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3.
20 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 20.
21 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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Among the 85% who did not accept the data-collection practice,
one in two (52%) had earlier said that they gave or would likely give
the valued site their real name and email address. 6 Yet those bits of
information are what a site needs to begin creating a stream of data
about them-the very flow, personally identifiable or not, that they
refused to allow in response to the scenario. Moreover, 63% of the
people who said they had provided this data had also agreed that the
mere presence of a website privacy policy means that the website will
not share data with other firms.2 7 Bringing these two results together
suggests that at least one out of every three respondents who refused to
barter their information either do not understand or do not think
through the privacy outcomes of basic data-collection activities on the
Internet.
Similarly, other fundamental processes involved in online
interactions are not very well understood by the consumer. In a related
survey, Acquisti and Grossklags show that individuals are often unable
to name obvious parties, beyond the merchant and the consumer, that
have access to consumer data during and after an online credit card
transaction, such as the credit card company.2 8 These findings help
uncover the important distinction between knowledge about
commercial practices that is active and actionable, and knowledge that
is passive or completely lacking. Most consumers have some passive
knowledge about the roles played by credit card companies, other third
parties, and technical processes, but it is doubtful that this knowledge
is always available to them when they are actively making decisions.
D. CONSUMERS MISUNDERSTAND MANY RULES ABOUT PRIVACY IN
THE MARKETPLACE
These misconceptions about information privacy and data practices
are, however, merely the tip of an iceberg of consumer confusion
concerning their rights and merchants' rights to consumer information
2 6 Ibid.
2 Ibid., 23.
2 8 When 119 university staff and students were confronted with the open-ended question:
"You completed a credit-card purchase with an online merchant. Besides you and the
merchant Web site, who else has data about parts of your transaction?" 34.5 percent of the
sample answered "nobody," 21.9 percent answered "my credit card company or bank," and
19.3 percent answered "hackers or distributors of spyware." A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags,
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, IEEE Sec. & Privacy 3, no. 1 (2005):
26-33.
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in the marketplace. Table 1 lists true-or-false statements that the 2005
Annenberg survey presented to its representative national sample.
29
The answers indicate a low level of understanding of consumer rights
and redress in the marketplace. A high proportion of consumers
believe they have certain privacy rights-notably consistent with those
provided under FIPPS-when they do not. Others simply have no idea
what rights they have.
Table 1: True/false responses to statements about rules of
profiling, behavioral targeting, price discrimination and recourse
in the marketplace. (1,500 persons sampled)
%T %F %DK
Most online merchants give me the opportunity to 23 53 25
see the information they gather about me.
47% did not know the right answer
Most online merchants allow me the opportunity to 19 50 30
erase information they have gathered about me.
50% did not know the right answer
A website is allowed to share information about me 51 29 20
with affiliates without telling me the names of the
affiliates.
49% did not know the right answer
It is legal for an online store to charge different 38 29 33
people different prices at the same time of day.
62% did not know the right answer
Respondent correctly identifies the name of a 34 66 --
credit-reporting agency.
66% did not know the right answer
By law, a site such as Expedia or Orbitz that 37 32 31
compares prices on different airlines must include
the lowest airline prices.
68% did not know the right answer
29 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 15.
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Table 1: (continued)
It is legal for an offline store to charge different 29 42 29
people different prices at the same time of day.
71% did not know the right answer
Bold numbers indicate the correct answer. Sums greater than 100% result
from rounding errors. DK=Don't Know
A 2007 Golden Bear telephone survey of Californians reinforces
the idea of consumer misunderstanding about online marketplace
privacy policies and rules. 30 This survey focused on people who have
actually purchased items on the Internet and, as such, would
presumably be more informed than participants in the Annenberg
studies, who were adults who used the Internet for any reason.
Moreover, the statements about rules and privacy policies in the
Golden Bear survey were more varied than those in the Annenberg
study.
Despite their presumably greater stake in commerce and privacy
than the Annenberg respondents, the Golden Bear respondents
followed the same pattern; almost 70% of the respondents knew that
sites are allowed to keep records of their addresses and purchase
histories. The respondents' knowledge was much worse, however,
with respect to the other statements about privacy policies and
marketplace rules, as Table 2 shows. Note that when presented with a
privacy-policy statement that was similar to the one in the Annenberg
study-if a website has a privacy policy, it means that the site cannot
sell information about your address and purchase information to other
companies-the percentage of respondents who answered incorrectly
was very similar, 55% in Golden Bear compared to 59% in
Annenberg.
30 The 2007 Golden Bear Omnibus Survey was a random-digit telephone survey of 1,186
English- and Spanish-speaking adults in California. It was conducted by the University of
California's Survey Research Center using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing
(CATI) to landline and wireless phones from April 30, 2007, to September 2, 2007. It was
funded by the Survey Research Center. The privacy questions were funded by the Samuelson
Clinic.
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Table 2: True/false responses to statements about rules of the
online marketplace.
%T %F %DK
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 19.7 69.1 11.2
site cannot keep records of your address and
purchase history. (188 persons sampled)
30.9% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 36.1 54.8 9.1
site cannot give information about your address
and purchases to the government. (208 persons
sampled)
45.2% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 37.1 52.2 10.7
site cannot use information to analyze your online
activities. (205 persons sampled)
47.8% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 39.8 49.4 10.8
site cannot buy information about you from other
sources to analyze your online activities.
(251 persons sampled)
50.6% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 47.8 44.9 7.2
site cannot share information about your address
and purchases with affiliated companies that are
owned by the website. (207 persons sampled)
55% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 51.9 39.9 8.2
you have the right to require the website to tell
you what other businesses purchased your
personal information. (208 persons sampled)
60.1% did not know the right answer
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Table 2: (continued) %T %F %DK
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 49.5 35.9 14.6
you have the right to obtain help from the website,
if information you provided to it was used for
identity theft. (198 persons sampled)
64.1% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 55.4 35.5 9.1
site cannot sell information about your address
and purchase information to other companies.
(231 persons sampled)
64.5% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 53 34.3 12.6
you have the right to sue the website for damages
if it violates your privacy. (230 persons sampled)
65.6% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 56.8 27.9 15.3
you have the right to access your personal
information stored on the site and correct it.
(222 persons sampled)
72.1% did not know the right answer
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 64.7 24.7 10.7
you have the right to be notified if the website has
a security breach that leaks information about you
to others. (215 persons sampled)
75.4 did not know the right answer
It a website has a privacy policy, it means that
you have the right to require the company to
delete your personal information upon your
request. (213 persons sampled)
77% did not know the right answer
68.1
Bold numbers indicate the correct answer. Sums greater than 100% result
from rounding errors. DK=Don't Know.
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E. PRIVACY NOTICES ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT
Despite self-regulatory efforts, there remains substantial confusion
among consumers about information privacy. Much of the FTC's
attention has focused on the development of improved disclosures.
Surveys, user studies, and focus groups do support the agency's belief
that users would welcome well-crafted, short notices in the hope that
they will ease comprehension of privacy policies.
In research supported by the National Science Foundation Science
and Technology Center, Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure
Technologies ("TRUST"), 31 researchers at U.C. Berkeley's Samuelson
Clinic have examined the utility of short notices and variations on
notice timing in communicating about privacy, security, and other
consequences of software installation.32  The installation of
downloadable software almost always involves the click-through to
privacy notices and EULAs. Notices are usually presented in a
separate screen during installation and are reasonably accessible to the
user. Users are involved in a main task of evaluating and deciding
whether to install a piece of software. Given that information about
security, privacy, and functionality are disclosed during the installation
process, this is a natural context in which to explore the utility of such
notices and disclosures.
Recent studies involving EULAs suggest that they are largely
ineffective as a means of communicating with consumers. EULAs,
terms-of-service agreements ("ToS"), and privacy policies present
complex legal information. Research shows that notices' complexity
31 This work was generously supported by the NSF Science and Technology Center, Team for
Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies ("TRUST"), NSF CCF-0424422. Computer
trustworthiness continues to increase in importance as a pressing scientific, economic, and
social problem. As a consequence, there is an acute need for developing a much deeper
understanding of the scientific foundations of cyber security and critical infrastructure
systems, as well as their implications for economic and public policy. In response to this
need, TRUST is devoted to the development of a new science and technology that will
radically transform the ability of organizations (software vendors, operators, local and federal
agencies) to design, build, and operate trustworthy information systems for our critical
infrastructure. The Center brings together a team with a proven track record in relevant areas
of computer security, systems modeling and analysis, software technology, economics, and
social sciences. See http://trust.eecs.berkeley.edu/ for details of all of TRUST's research.
32 For detailed results of the studies, see Nathaniel Good and others, "Stopping Spyware at the
Gate: A User Study of Privacy, Notice and Spyware," in Proceedings of the Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security (New York: ACM Press, 2005), 43-52; Nathaniel Good and
others, "Noticing Notice: A Large-scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License
Agreements" in Proceedings of CHI 2007 (New York: ACM Press, 2007), 607-16.
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hampers users' ability to understand such agreements. For example,
Jensen and Potts studied a sample of 64 privacy policies from high-
traffic and healthcare websites.33  They found that the policies'
formats, locations on the websites, and legal content severely limit
users' ability to make informed decisions based on them.
34
In another study that produced similar results, Grossklags and
Good evaluated the notice practices of 50 popular downloadable
programs. 35 The location and presentation of the notices differed from
vendor to vendor, which would make it more difficult for consumers to
find relevant information. These notices were often difficult to
understand or even read. The average EULA was over 2500 words
long and would require approximately thirteen minutes for a consumer
of average reading skill to parse, according to accepted reading
metrics. Font sizes were often too small to be read easily and notices
were displayed in comparatively small windows, for example, showing
only one percent of the complete notice text at a time.
Research indicates that simplifying the notices has a limited effect.
Masson and Waldron showed that simplifying the language of legal
contracts, for example, by using easier words and replacing obscure
terms with common ones, could not achieve very high degrees of
comprehension. 36  This is because "non-experts have difficulty
understanding complex legal concepts that sometimes conflict with
prior knowledge and beliefs.
37
Vila and others ask whether users will ever bother to read or
believe privacy policies at all.38 They claim that because the cost of
33 Jensen and Potts, "Privacy Policies as Decision-making Tools: An Evaluation on Online
Privacy Notices."
34 Ibid.
35 Jens Grossklags and Nathan Good, "Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy
Makers and Usability Designers," in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Berlin: Springer,
2008), 341-55. Originally presented at Useable Security (USEC'07), February 15-16, 2007.
Also available online at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-jensg/research/
paper/Grossklags07-USEC.pdf.
36 M.E.J. Masson and M.A. Waldron, "Comprehension of Legal Contracts by Non-experts:
Effectiveness of Plain Language Redrafting," Applied Cognitive Psychology 8 (1994): 67-85.
37 Ibid.
38 T. Vila, R. Greenstadt and D. Molnar, "Why We Can't be Bothered Reading Privacy
Policies - Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market," in Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Electronic Commerce (Pittsburg: ICEC, 2005), 403-07. Also
available online at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/-greenie/econprivacy.pdf.
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misrepresentation in a privacy policy is low and that some of the
privacy policies are not trustworthy, users do not feel it is worth their
time to read or pay attention to them. 39 In contrast, results from the
2003 Annenberg survey suggest that relatively high proportions of
adults with the Internet at home trust privacy policies; 71% agreed or
agreed strongly, "I look to see if a website has a privacy policy before
answering any questions." 40  Anecdotal evidence does, however,
support the impression that people do not read the policies. One
software provider included a $1000 cash prize offer in a EULA that
was displayed during every software installation. It took four months
and 3,000 downloads of the software for someone to notice the clause
and claim the prize.
41
Among 222 study participants, the Samuelson Clinic found that
only 1.4% reported reading EULAs often and thoroughly, 66.2% admit
to rarely reading or browsing the contents of EULAs, and 7.7%
indicated that they have not noticed these agreements in the past or
have never read them.42
Short and layered notices are one method that has been proposed to
overcome these problems. The Samuelson Clinic has performed a
controlled study of short notices and timing of notices. The study
examined whether consumers were happy with their installation
decisions after they were fully informed of the program's activities;
this is termed "regret." When downloading and installing programs,
subjects were shown either the EULA by itself or the EULA and a
short notice highlighting core aspects of performance, privacy and
security.
During the post-experimental survey, all study participants were
shown the short notices. When asked whether they would install the
programs they chose to install during the experiment, participants who
received the short notices during the study were less likely to reverse
their earlier decision to install software. However, many users, both
those who originally received the short notice and those who did not,
expressed regret about their installation decisions after reading the
short notice during the exit interview. Overall, the incidence of regret
'9 Ibid.
40 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 18.
41 Larry Magid, It Pays To Read License Agreements,
http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (accessed January 22, 2008).
42 See 2007 Golden Bear Omnibus Survey.
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was high. Importantly, however, the incidence of regret was lower
when short notices were received before program installation.
F. OTHER FORCES ALSO PREVENT CONSUMERS
FROM SUCCESSFUL PRIVACY PROTECTION
Beyond the issues of whether consumers read and comprehend
privacy policies, individuals' ability to make marketplace privacy
decisions that reflect their needs is hampered by several factors.
Incomplete information is a major difficulty. Even when they read
privacy notices and EULAs, consumers have trouble evaluating the
consequences of disclosing the bundles of information that companies
say they are taking. Consumers have difficulty assessing and valuing
certain privacy risks, which makes their decisions seem unpredictable,
even random. Sometimes risks become known only after a security
breach or privacy invasion.
Moreover, while many consumers are certainly aware of many
privacy risks, they may not be well informed about the magnitude of
these risks in certain circumstances. Acquisti and Grossklags report,
for example, that 73% of respondents in their survey underestimated
the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft.
43
Adding to the problem of incomplete information is the
challenge of grasping the abilities of technologists to take
seemingly innocuous items of information and link them in
new, unexpected ways. For example, when asked, "Imagine
that somebody does not know you but knows your date of
birth, sex, and zip code. What do you think the probability is
that this person can uniquely identify you based on those
data?," 68.6% answered that the probability was 50% or less
(and 45.5% of respondents believed that probability to be
less than 25%). According to Carnegie Mellon University
researcher Latanya Sweeney, however, 87% of the US
population may be uniquely identified personally through a
5-digit zip code, birth date, and sex. To expWect individuals
to foresee such possibilities is unreasonable.
43 Acquisti and Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality.
44 Ibid., 24.
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Even if individuals have access to complete information about privacy
risks and modes of protection, they might not be able to process
enough data to formulate a rational privacy-sensitive decision. Human
beings' rationality is bounded, which limits our ability to acquire and
then apply information. Furthermore, consumers are busy and
experience many demands on their attention. They cannot be expected
to be familiar with all the vagaries of technologies, e-commerce, and
evolving business practices.
G. CONSUMERS ARE LIMITED IN THEIR ATTEMPTS
TO PROTECT THEIR INFORMATION
Evidence abounds that consumers do try to protect their privacy.
Survey results released in June 2004 by Privacy & American Business
found that two-thirds of Americans have taken some steps to protect
their privacy.45 In fact, 87% indicated that they had asked a company
to remove their information from a marketing database; 60% decided
not to patronize a store because of doubts about the company's privacy
protections; and 65% had declined to register at an e-commerce site
because of privacy concerns. 46 Among individuals that Westin has
described as the "privacy unconcerned," 47% reported that they
engaged in four out of seven identified privacy-protecting behaviors,
while 65% of the "privacy pragmatists" had engaged in these
behaviors.4
7
Situational characteristics can reduce consumers' efforts to protect
their information. For example, Spiekermann, Grossklags, and
Berendt observed 171 study participants while they shopped online,
specifically when they interacted with an anthropomorphic sales
advisor. By answering questions posed by the advisor, study
participants could receive recommendations about products. The
advisor also asked questions that were highly intrusive of privacy or
that requested irrelevant information. Participants could simply have
refused to respond to these questions, thereby protecting themselves
against potential threats. However, regardless of the strength of the
participants' self-reported privacy preferences, their actual responses
45 Privacy & American Business, "New National Survey on Consumer Privacy Attitudes to be
Released at Privacy & American Business Landmark Conference," news release, June 10,
2004.
46 Ibid.
47 Westin, "Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy," 445.
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to the advisor revealed much more information than their self-reported
preferences predicted, even among the "privacy-concerned"
individuals. These results demonstrate the power of interactive
marketing techniques to lead even privacy-motivated consumers to
behave in ways that appear contradictory to their stated preferences.
48
The similarity between the behavior of the "unconcerned" participants
and the behavior of participants who claim to be highly concerned
about privacy suggests that Westin's dichotomy may be less useful
than previously thought in capturing the nuances of consumers'
attitudes on privacy.
Further evidence that we need a more differentiated understanding
of protection behaviors is provided by Acquisti and Grossklags."
They found that at least 75% of the consumers did adopt at least one
strategy or technology, or otherwise took some action, to protect their
privacy, such as interrupting purchases before entering personal
information or providing incorrect information in website forms.
50
However, they also found that use of specific technologies was
consistently low across the sample population. 51 For example, 67% of
respondents never encrypted their email, 82% never put a credit alert
on their credit report, and 82% never removed their phone numbers
from public directories.
52
Other findings suggest that while people would like to protect their
privacy, and try to at the most basic levels, a large proportion of these
people do not have the knowledge necessary to move beyond the very
basics of privacy-protective behavior. Before concluding that people
do not put a credit alert on their credit report because they are lazy or
uncaring, recall the Annenberg survey finding that 66% do not know
the name of a credit agency and 76% do not correctly respond "false"
to the statement, "the Federal Trade Commission will correct errors in
credit reports if it is shown proof of the errors."
48 S. Spiekermann, J. Grossklags and B. Berendt, "E-Privacy in 2nd Generation E-Commerce:
Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior," in Proceedings of the 3rdACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, (New York: ACM Press, 2001), 38-47. Also available online at
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-jensg/research/paper/grossklags-e-Privacy.pdf
49 Acquisti and Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 26-33.
50 Ibid.
"' Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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In the online environment, the complexity of privacy-protecting
actions increases, and thus the likelihood that Americans perform them
decreases substantially. The 2003 Annenberg survey asked American
adults who use the Internet at home if they performed certain activities
in relation to controlling their information online; 65% said that the
have erased unwanted cookies at least once. This finding is consistent
with the finding that a clear majority of the sample-59%--was aware
of what cookies do; people know that when they go online, sites
collect information on them even if they do not register. The
percentage applying other privacy tools drops steeply, however. Only
43% said that they have used filters to block unwanted email, 23%
said they have used software that looks for spyware, and 17% said
they have used anonymizers--"software that hides your computer's
identity from websites that they visit."
IV. WHAT THE FTC MUST CONFRONT IN THE NEXT DECADE
A. AMERICANS' CONTINUING CONCERNS AND
CONFUSIONS ABOUT INFORMATION PRIVACY
Research indicates that American consumers care deeply about
information privacy and worry that it is not well protected. It also
reveals that great majorities of American consumers do not grasp basic
facts about companies' data collection practices, do not know the laws
that govern data protection, do not read or comprehend the notices that
are supposed to explain data practices and afford privacy choices, and
are confronted with many social and psychological factors that
undermine their ability to protect their privacy during marketplace
transactions.
Most fundamentally, research indicates that a large majority of
American adults believe that the existence of a "privacy policy" on a
website indicates some level of substantive privacy protection for their
personal information. The finding is not an aberration. Two major
national surveys performed two years apart, in 2003 and 2005,
revealed virtually the same percentage of Americans-almost 60%-
believed that "when a website has a privacy policy, that means it will
not share information about them with other websites or companies. 53
In the 2005 survey, where the statement was presented in true/false
" Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 4; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation, 20.
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form, 59% incorrectly said the statement was true and an additional
16% said they did not know if it was true or false.
54
Because American consumers mistakenly believe that a "privacy
policy" indicates a level of substantive privacy protection, they do not
read them. The failure to read privacy policies leaves consumers
unaware of data practices such as data-mining and allows a wide range
of practices that are inconsistent with consumer expectations to avoid
consumer scrutiny.
Under the Federal Trade Commission's notice and choice regime,
the operating assumption is that people will make good choices if they
are provided with good information. Our studies have found that
Americans do not have good, i.e., full and understandable, information
about data practices that affect their privacy.55 More significantly,
even if full and understandable information is provided in a short
format, consumers retain the belief that the mere invocation of the
term "privacy policy" creates a baseline set of protections for their
information. That belief, along with other cognitive biases, limits the
number of consumers who read and act on such privacy notices. If a
website contains a privacy policy that states it will reveal users' data to
affiliates or other companies without the users' permission, then the
privacy of consumers who stop reading once they see that a privacy
policy exists is undermined.
B. THE CURRENT NOTICE-BASED APPROACH HAS CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NETWORK ITSELF
Consumers' basic misunderstanding of the purpose of privacy
policies is one of many misconceptions that contribute to confusion in
the online marketplace. When consumers do not read, or read but
cannot understand, privacy notices and EULAs on websites and
software, they may unwittingly install malicious programs that exploit
consumer machines to the detriment of the entire Internet. Unless
"privacy policies" provide some baseline privacy protections, the
notice-based privacy regime will continue to unintentionally lead
consumers to "consent" to invasive program installations and other
practices. By doing so, they lower the security protections of the
entire network, not just their own computers.
5 4 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 15.
55 See Turow, Americans and Online Privacy; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation.
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One case in point is the 2005 wide-scale installation of a "rootkit"
by purchasers of music CDs.56 In an attempt to control the distribution
of songs on the CD, Sony bundled a program that ran silently in the
background and opened many computers to security vulnerabilities.
Similarly, spyware, even if "consensually" installed pursuant to a
EULA, can allow millions of computers to be controlled by others.
This allows bad actors to create "botnets," e.g. zombie networks of
consumers' computers, which can be remotely directed to engage in
denial-of-service attacks and other malicious acts.
C. THE NEED TO ADOPT THREE POLICIES
TO SUPPORT INFORMATION PRIVACY
To advance privacy, the Federal Trade Commission should take
the following three steps:
1. THE FTC SHOULD POLICE THE TERM "PRIVACY POLICY"
Two national surveys by the Annenberg Public Policy Center
revealed that to a majority of American consumers, "privacy policy"
carries a particular meaning: that a website will not disclose personal
information to others without the consumer's permission. While many
websites begin their privacy policies with the claim that "your privacy
is important to us," many of these same policies disclose further down
that the websites collect quite a bit of the information from their users
and often do share the information with affiliates, marketers, or other
entities. Note, too, that information-sharing agreements with third
parties generally are under no legal requirement to be disclosed; there
is no other source for this omitted information. The result is a
situation where consumers assume that the privacy policy label
indicates that the site will not share data, whereas the opposite may be
true and the policy may or may not state what is done with the
information.
Given consumers' expectations, the use of the term "privacy
policy" absent some baseline privacy protections, ought to be
considered deceptive. The Commission evaluates potentially
deceptive marketing communications to consumers based upon
56 Deirdre K. Mulligan and Aaron K. Perzanowski, "The Magnificence of the Disaster:
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident," Berkeley Technology Law Journal 22
(2007): 1157.
[Vol. 3:3
2007-08] TUJROW, HOOFNAGLE, MULLIGAN, GOOD & GROSSKLAGS 747
whether the representation is "likely to mislead reasonable consumers
under the circumstances. The test is whether the consumers'
interpretation or reaction is reasonable."57  The FTC's guidance
specifies that communications should be judged upon "the basis of the
net general impression conveyed ..... "8 The Policy Statement on
Deception advances five model questions for evaluating a
representation: how clear is the representation, how conspicuous is any
qualifying information, how important is the omitted information, do
other sources for the omitted information exist, and how familiar is the
public with the product or service? 9
Given consumer expectations, the use of the label "privacy policy"
by websites that share information about their users without user
permission is deceptive. First, surveys demonstrate that reasonable
consumers believe that the mere presence of a privacy policy means
that substantive protections are in place to prevent the sharing of their
information. Websites' top-level assertions about privacy are often
very clear; sites abound with privacy seals and claims that "your
privacy is important to us." As such, "privacy" is used as a marketing
tool, a type of quality representation that consumers find meaning in
and rely upon. Qualifying information, by contrast, is buried within
privacy policies in the fine print. As we have shown, this qualifying
information is often not understandable and often goes unread by
consumers who presume that the policies extend many rights, and thus
are not necessary to read.60 In cases where sites share information
without consumer consent, therefore, the use of the term "privacy
policy" is deceptive under FTC guidelines.
The Federal Trade Commission should rule, then, that websites
using the label "privacy policy" are deceptive unless those sites
promise not to share information about their users without their
permission. While sites that engage in such sharing without user
permission should be required to make disclosures, they should not be
allowed to refer to such disclosures as "privacy policies."
57 James C. Miller III, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (October 14, 1983). Also available
online at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decepthtm.
58 Ibid.
'9 Ibid.
" See Turow, Americans and Online Privacy; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation.
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2. PRIVACY MECHANISMS SHOULD BE VETTED
BY USABILITY AND OTHER EXPERTS
Currently, notices are written to satisfy lawyers. The notices do
not help consumers make privacy choices that reflect their privacy
interests. If the FTC wants consumers to make smart decisions on
privacy, then experts in usability and other areas need a seat at the
table. Such experts need to help craft privacy-protecting mechanisms.
Consumers would benefit from the involvement of experts in usability
and psychology in designing notices and other privacy mechanisms.
Research at the Samuelson Clinic and elsewhere is beginning to
identify the features that can improve the chances that consumers read,
comprehend and act upon privacy notices in a manner consistent with
their needs and expectations. The FTC needs to avail itself of that
research and the expertise behind it.
3. THE FTC SHOULD SET BENCHMARKS FOR SELF-REGULATION
In announcing the 2006 Tech-ade hearings, Chairman Majoras
asked:
[W]hat have we learned over the past decade? How can we
apply those lessons to what we do know, and what we
cannot know, as we look to the future? And how can we
best protect consumers in a marketplace that now knows no
bounds, that is virtual, 24-7, and truly global?
6
'
The FTC would be better equipped to evaluate what it has learned
about self-regulation if it had adopted a reasonable recommendation
offered by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Executive Director Beth
Givens in 1996-that the agency set performance benchmarks for self-
regulation. 62 Without benchmarks, self-regulation and regulation, for
that matter, have no clear metrics for measuring success. Accordingly,
we recommend that the FTC define clear benchmarks for its privacy
initiatives-educational, regulatory and self-regulatory-and evaluate
its approach against those benchmarks between now and 2016.
61 See Majoras, Anti-Spyware Coalition.
62 FTC, Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure, n.
156 (Dec. 2006).
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V. CONCLUSION
The next decade will bring new technologies that will be able to
extract far more information from and about Americans than was
previously possible.63 These technologies will raise new and complex
privacy issues. The FTC should plan its activities for the next decade
based on a reasoned assessment of its policy initiatives over the last
ten years. While some progress has been made, it is clear that
consumers remain unable to fully effectuate their privacy rights in the
marketplace. Providing consumers with more information about data
practices has not led to greater consumer confidence or to a rich
marketplace of privacy options for consumers. It is clear that if the
FTC continues to pursue a market-based approach, additional
interventions are necessary to ensure that consumers are not misled
and have straightforward information available that facilitates privacy
choices.
63 Turow, supra note 1.

